I once complained to Etchemendy (author of the class’s logic text and Provost at Stanford) that I was failing the less he created. He told me that, in fact, the class existed in a similar form when he was an undergrad, and he failed it too.

I still have nightmares about Phil160A.

It seems to me that Pascal was not so much trying to prove:

(1) It is irrational to disbelieve in God.

as trying to show:

(2) It is rational to believe in God.

Philosophers, et al., treat it as (1), of course, but I think Pascal may have been trying to give intellectual comfort to those who were wavering in their commitment to belief in God because of the social and intellectual pressures of French rationalism (including himself, natch).

But treating it as (2) removes silliness like Taddock and Osterdal’s (that is, it would be silly to send Taddock any money). (2) doeesn’t imply (1), and isn’t inconsistent with “It is rational to disbelieve in God.”

The SEP (in the boring bits you disliked) takes this up a bit, in its discussion of Pascal’s recommendation to those who have some measure of belief but are tempted to disbelieve. That is, take up the practices of belief in order to increase belief. But it’s ok to do so, it’s not irrational (says Pascal) because of the infinite value of belief.

I sort of preached a sermon on this (Ryan heard it), which I posted at The Child of Grace at the Infinite Café.