Modelling environmentalism thinking

It’s a human political belief model — based on Cyc! I’m not sure logic represents how people think all that well, but seeing the formalization of ideology is fascinating. And besides, the methodology of cognitive modelling is awesome. The link:

Modeling How People Think About Sustainability

David C. James, M. P. Aff

LBJ School of Public Affairs
The University of Texas at Austin
May 2005

First Reader: Lodis Rhodes
Second Reader: Chandler Stolp

How effectively can a computer model represent the belief systems of different people? How would one go about representing a belief system using formal logic? How would that ideology react to different scenarios related to sustainable development? The author constructs the Cyc Agent-Scenario (CAS) model as a way to investigate these questions. The CAS model is built on top of ResearchCyc, a knowledge base (KB) and logical inference engine. The model consists of two agents (Libertarian and Green) and two scenarios. The model simulates how agents would think about or judge the scenarios. Theoretical and practical concerns of modeling, logic, rationality, and emotion are discussed. The CAS model is compared against other approaches, such as econometrics and polling, that are useful for public policy practitioners. Lastly, potential applications of the model for democratic deliberation, negotiation, planning, and participation are explored.

Leave a comment

monkey economics (and brothels)

This is a fun one: researchers trained capuchin monkeys to understand tokens as currency by letting them exchange them for food. Then they did all sorts of behavioral economics-y tests like finding consistency of preferences revealed in price shocks. The monkeys even displayed loss aversion at rates almost identical to humans! And along the way they got “prostitution”:

Something else happened during that chaotic scene, something that convinced Chen of the monkeys’ true grasp of money. Perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of money, after all, is its fungibility, the fact that it can be used to buy not just food but anything. During the chaos in the monkey cage, Chen saw something out of the corner of his eye that he would later try to play down but in his heart of hearts he knew to be true. What he witnessed was probably the first observed exchange of money for sex in the history of monkeykind. (Further proof that the monkeys truly understood money: the monkey who was paid for sex immediately traded the token in for a grape.)

Mark Liberman interestingly points out the monkeys seem to be an exception to Adam Smith’s assertion that animals don’t do trades; but since capuchins still have simple cognition and no language abilities, the human behavior of trade can’t be based on uniquely human cognitive capabilities like Smith argues.

Leave a comment

more argumentation & AI/formal modelling links

ArgMAS (argumentation in multi-agent systems) 2005
Computational Models of Natural Argument (CMNA) 2005

Conferences in Edinburgh and the Netherlands, seems to make sense.

Leave a comment

zombies!

This is fairly funny, by good ol’ Jaron Lanier on that good ol’ topic, AI and philosophy: You can’t argue with a zombie

Thanks to neurodudes.

Leave a comment

looking for related blogs/links

What are good other resources on the internet for social science, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence (or computation more generally)? I’m looking for blog-like things in particular — stay updated on new research and the like.

here’s the list so far, trying to be interdisciplinary as possible. A cognitive neuroscience or neuroeconomics blog would be a nice addition.

other possibilities… need to search technorati.com for more…

  • neurodudes
  • http://www.kybernetica.com/
  • http://www.karmachakra.com/aiknowledge/

Perhaps mailing lists and/or newsgroups are better for some of these topics.

Leave a comment

idea: Morals are heuristics for socially optimal behavior

A common cognitive science view (H. Simon):
Heuristics/biases are useful rules-of-thumb to approximate optimizing behavior given computational constraints.

Consider the chess-playing heuristic “try not to lose your queen”. Since you can’t analyze all possible chess moves, it’s nice to have such a rule-of-thumb to narrow down possible actions to consider. You can reject out of hand an action that leads to losing your queen. This heuristic helps to approximate optimal chess-playing behavior given your computational constraints.

Similarly, moral rules, tendencies, associations, and ontologies are heuristics to approximate socially optimal behavior. “Lying is bad” is a useful rule-of-thumb that usually gets good results for society. Codifying it as a norm — meaning, there’s 3rd party punishment and/or self-punishment (guilt) when it’s violated, thus the rule should get obeyed — is the implementation of a social-level heuristic that generally gives useful behavior.

Just like this Simonian definition of a heuristic, “Lying is bad” is necessary due to computational and informational limitations. You can’t foresee very well that lying could cause trouble down the road. In fact, you may be pretty sure it could give good results in the short-term. However, since it’s usually actually bad, a norm against it may be overall socially beneficial. Then for learning or group selection reasons (people imitate successful strategies, groups with the norm outcompete other groups), a socially beneficial norm may take root and spread.

That does not mean “lying is bad” is some sort of universal truth, or even that it can be evaluated as a truth-functional statement (that is, must resolve to true/false in a certain world). That would imply there is are actually definite sets of good and bad things. Instead, it may be useful to think of a fictionalist explanation: this moral ontology of goodness/badness is a pragmatically useful fiction (useful because it helps bring about a just and orderly world.) Specifically, it does this by functioning as a computational shortcut.

Of course, whether morals are real or not should be irrelevant for a behavioral analysis of morality, but that issue always seems to get dragged in anyway, perhaps because we seem to care about it a lot.

1 Comment

1st International Conference on Computational Models of Argument (COMMA06)

does this look awesome or what? Imagine if you could computationally model the argumentation and communication in economic and political behavior. To say nothing of the AI applications too!

PRELIMINARY ANNOUNCEMENT
1st International Conference on Computational Models of Argument (COMMA06)

Organised by the ASPIC project (www.argumentation.org)
The University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
11th-12th September 2006 (provisional)

General Chair: Professor Michael J. Wooldridge
Programme Chair: Paul E. Dunne

Over the past decade argumentation has become increasingly important in Artificial Intelligence. It has provided a fruitful way of approaching non-monotonic and defeasible reasoning, deliberation about action, and agent communication scenarios such as negotiation. In application domains such as law, medicine and e-democracy it has come to be seen as an essential part of the reasoning.

Successful workshops have been associated with major Artificial Intelligence Conferences, notably the workshop series on Computational Models of Natural Argument held in conjunction with IJCAI and ECAI, and the series of ArgMAS workshops held in conjunction with AAMAS. The time is now right for a conference dedicated to all aspects of computational argument.

Topics include, but are not limited to:
* argumentation frameworks
* argument schemes
* argument in agent systems
* argument based negotiation
* computational properties of argumentation
* decision making based on argumentation
* dialogue based on argument
* e-democracy applications
* legal applications of argument
* medical applications of argument
* reasoning and argument about action.

A call for paper will be issued shortly. To be placed on an electronic mailing list for this conference e-mail:
comma@csc.liv.ac.uk

This entry was posted on Monday, June 6th, 2005 at 6:55 pm and is filed under

Leave a comment

Online Deliberation 2005 conference blog & more is up!

Check it out! We’ve got conference papers, abstracts, a huge program, and a kick-ass blog/photosharing/wiki system Alexandra Samuel put together. This conference is going to be great!

The conference home page is
http://www.online-deliberation.net/conf2005/

and inside, the blog, and the blog’s welcome message [sorry for all the links, trying to test trackbacks]

Leave a comment

go science

Is social science even worth doing when things like this get funded with hundreds of millions of federal dollars?

Many American youngsters participating in federally funded abstinence-only programs have been taught over the past three years that abortion can lead to sterility and suicide, that half the gay male teenagers in the United States have tested positive for the AIDS virus, and that touching a person’s genitals “can result in pregnancy,” a congressional staff analysis has found.

Among the misconceptions cited by Waxman’s investigators:

• A 43-day-old fetus is a “thinking person.”
• HIV, the virus that causes AIDS, can be spread via sweat and tears.
• Condoms fail to prevent HIV transmission as often as 31 percent of the time in heterosexual intercourse.

When used properly and consistently, condoms fail to prevent pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) less than 3 percent of the time, federal researchers say, and it is not known how many gay teenagers are HIV-positive. The assertion regarding gay teenagers may be a misinterpretation of data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention that found that 59 percent of HIV-infected males age 13 to 19 contracted the virus through homosexual relations.

Link: Some Abstinence Programs Mislead Teens, Report Says

Leave a comment

addiction & 2 problems of economics

This is my idea based off of Bernheim and Rangel’s model of addict decision-making. It’s a really neat model; it manages to relax rationality to allow someone to do something they don’t want to do because they’re addicted to it. [Rationality assumes a nice well-ordered set of preferences; this model hypothesizes as distinction between emotional "liking" and cognitive, forward "wanting" that can conflict.] The model is mathematically tractable, it can be used for public welfare analysis, and to top it off — it’s got neuroscientific grounding!

It appears to me there are two big criticisms of the economics discipline’s assumptions. One of course is rationality. The second has to do with the perfect structure of the market and environment that shapes both preferences and the ability to exercise them. One critique is about social structure: consumers are not atomistic individual units, but rather exchange information and ideas along networks of patterned social relations. (Social networks). For example, people do not find jobs by going to a marketplace with perfect information where firms offer to buy their labor at some equilibrium market price; rather, people almost always learn about job opportunities through friends and acquaintances, which present to a job-seeker only a tiny fraction of the labor market (Granovetter 1995, “Getting a Job 2nd Ed.”). The social structuralist perspective applies to addiction behavior too. Social pressures are often acknowledged to play a key role in starting and stopping drug use. Staying around friends who use drugs makes you more likely to continue use; a group of friends whose social relations all point towards each other will have a hard time breaking out than a group of people who maintain social ties to non-users.

The model of addiction behavior presented here is cognitively richer than a simple utility-maximizing-rational model, which makes adding new factors such as social structure/relations quite easy. Then notion of lifestyles that affect cues can be reformulated as social relations that affect cues. Spending time with a fellow addict increases your chance of going into “hot” mode and using the drug.

Social ties can also represent distribution channels for illegal drugs, which are very important in situations where drugs are criminalized and must necessarily be bought on a very imperfect, social-network-oriented market. How available drugs are is extremely important, and often availability comes through friends/acquaintances who are often also users. This is somewhat a supply-side consideration, though it’s integrated with the same social structure that’s important for cueing.

One approach to model social structure and addiction is to run this model to power an agent-based simulation. Hundreds or thousands of agents proceed according to the model, with the additional trait of having social ties with other agents. A social tie indicates that one agent can cue (tempt, or give/sell drugs) the other into “hot” mode, or pacify an addicted friend into “cold” mode. Social ties also affect “cold” mode decision-making: an agent with predominantly user friends should get less utility out of non-use activities than an agent with many non-user friends.

The effects of different social structures can be studied. In a world of close-knit groups with few ties between them, do we certain groups becoming populated with all addicts, and some groups staying clean? If we add the twist that agents shift their social ties to other agents like themselves, do we see a segregation of user vs. non-user social groups? More generally: does the existence of social structure create complex, emergent effects that are surprising or difficult to predict based on the initial individual agent model? Because of the reasons listed above, I’m inclined to suspect so, though it would be interesting to see what actually happens.

This would allow us to evaluate government policies that try to alter social structure. Many young students in U.S. schools undergo anti-drug education programs warning about the dangers of “peer pressure.” If an education program succeeds in weakening drug use transmission ties, how much can that retard the spread of drug use in the system, and under what circumstances? If, by causing agents to shift ties away from drug users, does that cause users to tie only to each other, quarantining them off for the benefit of non-users but exacerbating the problem for themselves? Or to evaluate the policy of criminalization: jailing drug users places them in an environment where they are connected to other drug users; if social ties are important to addiction, this should exacerbate their conditions.

Furthermore, such a study need not remain purely theoretical. I know of at least one study that did complete surveys of selected schools, and asked the students both questions about themselves [health status, say STD’s] and who their friends were [relational data]. They took data on a wide variety of health-related issues; it’s likely they took data on drug use too. Since they mapped out the entire social network of schools, you can go into one school and find networks of drug users and non-users. [I can’t find the cite for this study, but sociologists at Stanford are working with the data.] It may also be possible to design field work expressly for the purpose of finding data to support a good model.

Reference:

B. Douglas Bernheim and Antonio Rangel, “Addiction and Cue-Triggered Decision Processes”, forthcoming in the American Economic Review (mathematical appendix). Linked off of this webpage at the Stanford Neuroeconomics Lab.

Granovetter, Mark. Getting a Job 2nd Ed. year ???

Leave a comment